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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I examine the Canadian system of regulation of 
corporate takeover defenses with reference to the American system. 
This comparison involves: first, an investigation and survey of the 
structure of Canadian securities law; second, an analysis of Canada’s 
jurisprudence surrounding takeover defenses and its underlying 
philosophy of regulation; and third, a proposal to modify the Canadian 
system based on a brief analysis of the American system. This article 
proposes that Canada should place more trust in the shareholder 
franchise and should limit the ability of its regulators to interfere with a 
board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties in a takeover situation. 
Canada’s business corporation statutes protect shareholders much 
more effectively than their U.S. equivalents do. As a result, 
shareholders can better discipline their agents when those agents do not 
adequately serve their interests. These statutory protections complement 
Canada’s well-developed body of corporate common law governing the 
fiduciary duties of directors in takeover situations and otherwise. 
Directors’ fiduciary duties require them to take certain considerations 
into account in takeover situations; where directors fail to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties, shareholders can discipline them in court. 
However, directors currently receive conflicting directives from 
Canadian courts and Canadian securities commissions. Securities 
commissions are empowered to intervene in takeover bids to impose 
duties of their own devise on directors. These securities law duties 
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reflect different priorities than those articulated by courts holding on 
matters of common law fiduciary duty. This conflict creates confusion 
that is undesirable and untenable. 
Instead, Canada should adopt a more hands-off regulatory climate 
with regard to boards in takeover situations. Canada should trust in the 
application of well-established control mechanisms—specifically, the 
shareholder franchise and fiduciary duties as interpreted by Canadian 
courts and prosecuted by shareholders—to constrain the board while 
respecting its important management role according to traditional 
corporation theory. 
II. ANALYSIS 
1. Structural Overview of Canada’s System of Securities 
Regulation 
a. Introduction: Goals of the System 
The purpose of the Canadian regulatory system is to protect 
investors and to promote efficiency in the capital markets. Specifically, 
the system’s objective is “to protect investors from fraudulent, 
manipulative or misleading practices,” “to ensure investors have fair 
access to market facilities and market or price information,” and “to 
reduce the risk of failure of market intermediaries and when it cannot be 
avoided. . .seek to reduce the impact on investors and other market 
participants.”
1
 These goals are reflected in the statutes that form the 
basis for Canada’s securities law.
2
 
But these goals are compromised by the structure of the regulatory 
system. As a matter of Canadian constitutional law, the ten provinces 
and three territories historically have been accorded independent 
authority over securities regulation under the provincial “property and 
civil rights” power.
3
 And, unlike in the U.S., each securities commission 
has direct and substantive jurisdiction over boards in takeover situations 
in addition to the jurisdiction traditionally exercised by common law 
courts. This fragmented and disjointed regulatory system has led to 
 
1  William S. Rice, Introduction to the Canadian Securities Administrators, CANADIAN 
SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/our-mission.aspx. 
2  See, e.g., Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 (“OSA”), § 1.1 (Can.).  
3  Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] 1 W.W.R. 578 Olms. (Can.). 
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confusion regarding basic securities law policy—both as between 
jurisdictions and among market participants. As between jurisdictions, 
it allows for divergence in application of supposedly national policies 
that causes uncertainty in Canada’s capital markets. For market 
participants, it creates an environment of potentially conflicting 
directives from the judicial branch and the administrative branch. 
b. A Fragmented System 
    i. Securities law defined, jurisdiction by jurisdiction 
Securities regulation in Canada is an American federalist’s dream 
come true. Unlike in the U.S., Canada does not have a securities 
regulatory authority at the federal government level. There is no 
Canadian equivalent of the SEC, and the Supreme Court of Canada (the 
“SCC”) recently held that such a national regulator would be 
unconstitutional.
4
 Instead, each of Canada’s thirteen jurisdictions has its 
own securities commission constituted by a separate enabling statute, 
that province’s Securities Act. The body of securities law in each 
province consists of (i) the Act, (ii) the legally binding rules and 
regulations promulgated by the commissions under that Act, and 
(iii) nonbinding policies including the decisions of the commissions 
interpreting the statute and the rules and regulations with respect to a 
particular person or company.
5
 Provincial securities commissions are 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the standards imposed on 
registrants by securities law so defined and by stock exchange rules (if 
one exists in the province).
6
 But unlike the SEC, Canadian securities 
commissions’ purview includes enforcement of certain substantive 
policies that in the American system would be governed by state 
corporate law, such as the regulation of takeover defences. In other 
words, securities law in Canada governs more than mere disclosure 
obligations: a Canadian securities commission also will initiate an 
enforcement action with regard to an issuer based on the broad and 
ambiguous “public interest jurisdiction” that each of Canada’s securities 
statutes grants to its securities commission.
7
 
 
4  Reference re Securities Act, [2011] SCC 66 (Can.), available at 
http://scc.lexum.org/en/2011/2011scc66/2011scc66.html . 
5  OSA § 1(1) (“Ontario securities law”) (Can.).  
6  BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP, SEC. LAW & PRACTICE §INT 9.1 — Purposes of the Act 
(3d ed. 2011). 
7  See, e.g., OSA § 127(1) (Can.) (“The Commission may make one or more of the 
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Enforcement decisions may be rendered after an administrative 
hearing before a commission. Parties to the hearing then may appeal the 
commission’s decision to that province’s or territory’s trial court
8
 or 
court of appeal.
9
 The commissions are bound by the orders of the 
judicial courts specified in the statute,
10
 but are not bound by the 
decisions of other securities commissions or even their own decisions.
11
 
These enforcement proceedings produce bodies of prior decisions in 
each province equivalent to policy statements by an administrative 
agency in the United States: the prior decisions of a given provincial 
securities commission guide but do not bind that commission (or any 
other). As a practical matter, the securities regulators interpret 
precedent—their own and that of other provinces—much as state courts 
would interpret case law. However, while Ontario and British Columbia 
generally are considered the leading jurisdictions in terms of securities 
law, there is not the same level of convergence as that which has 
occurred around Delaware law in the United States.
12
 
This jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction autonomy also extends to 
enforcement of the securities laws, substantive and otherwise. The 
thirteen securities commissions each have different powers and 
sanctions, and different levels of resources to devote to the various 
regulatory tasks that they are charged with. Accordingly, 
“[e]nforcement varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”
13
 Moreover, the 
fragmented multi-party nature of the system makes investigation of 
securities law violations in multiple jurisdictions inherently more 
difficult. Coordination of such complex investigations is procedurally 
challenging, and there is less direct accountability and therefore less 
inclination and political capital for any one jurisdiction to expend 
 
following orders if in its opinion it is in the public interest to make the order or orders . . . 
.”)(emphasis added). 
8  See, e.g., OSA § 9(1). 
9  See, e.g., Securities Act (British Columbia), R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 418 (“BCSA”), § 167 
(Can.); Securities Act (Saskatchewan), S.S. 1988-89, ch. S–42.2, § 11(1) (Can.).  
10 See, e.g., OSA § 61(8). 
11 See, e.g., BCSA § 167.5(1) (“Subject to the regulations, the commission may, by 
order, adopt or incorporate by reference all or any provisions of any extraprovincial 
securities laws . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
12 Cf. ANDREW KITCHING, SECURITIES REGULATION: CALLS FOR A SINGLE REGULATOR 8, 
PRB 08–38E (Library of Parliament (Can.), (Feb. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0838-e.htm . 
13 Id. at 9. 
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resources that would benefit other jurisdictions.
14
 
     ii. Stock exchanges 
Regulatory oversight of Canada’s capital markets is equally 
balkanised. A different regulator oversees each of Canada’s three main 
stock exchanges.
15
 The Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) is the 
lead regulator for the Toronto Stock Exchange, Canada’s senior equity 
market and its largest and most active stock exchange.
16
 The Alberta 
Securities Commission (“ASC”) and the British Columbia Securities 
Commission (“BCSC”) jointly are the lead regulators for the TSX 
Venture Exchange, a public venture capital marketplace for emerging 
companies.
17
 Quebec’s Autorité des marchés financiers is the lead 
regulator for the Bourse de Montréal, Canada’s derivatives exchange 
that trades futures contracts and options on equities, indices, currencies, 
exchange-traded funds, energy, and interest rates.
18
 These three 
exchanges all are owned by TMX Group, Inc., located in Toronto, 
Ontario.
19
 
Piecemeal regulation of these three arms of a single entity (TMX 
Group, Inc.) has several negative consequences. First, the system faces 
obvious economies of scope that could be realised by consolidating 
basic common administrative functions. Failure to realise these 
economies of scope necessarily increases transaction costs for all parties 
involved. Second, regulation by multiple smaller and more local 
regulators increases the vulnerability of the regulatory system to capture 
by special interests. Factions potentially can affect a disproportionate 
 
14 Cf. Stephan P. Sonnenberg, Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, Lecture to 
Negotiation Workshop B1 at Harvard Law School: Multiparty Negotiations (Mar. 3, 2011); 
see also Kitching, supra note 12, at 9. 
15 Rice, supra note 1. 
16 “OSC | Marketplaces, SROs & Clearing Agencies – Exchanges”, Ontario Securities 
Commission, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Marketplaces_exchanges_index.htm 
(last accessed March 23, 2012); “OSC | Marketplaces, SROs & Clearing Agencies –
 Exchanges – TMX Group Inc. and TSX Inc.”, Ontario Securities Commission, available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Marketplaces_tmx-tsx_index.htm (last accessed March 23, 
2012). 
17 “About ASC”, Alberta Securities Commission, available at 
http://www.albertasecurities.com/about/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed March 23, 2012). 
18 “Montréal Exchange | Regulation”, TMX Inc., http://reg.m-
x.ca/en/about/mission_roles (“Under the AMF oversight…”) (last accessed March 23, 
2012). 
19 TMX Group Inc. Corporate Profile, TMX Group Inc. (2010), available at 
http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/TMXGroupCorporateProfile.pdf. 
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influence over the regulatory policy applicable to their exchange. And 
third, oversight by multiple regulators reduces the efficiency with which 
the overall system manages systemic risk. Diffuse loci of regulation 
means that systemic risk associated with the individual stock exchanges 
could in the aggregate be sufficient to bring down the nation’s capital 
markets. Moreover, it might be more socially or economically optimal 
to allow a certain overall level of systemic risk, allocation of which 
could be better determined by a single regulator rather than by multiple 
regulators each of whom might over- or under-regulate in the aggregate. 
c. Attempts at Unity 
Canada’s securities commissions have taken some steps to mitigate 
this regulatory cacophony. For one, each commission delegates certain 
regulatory responsibilities, including with regard to Canada’s 
exchanges, to self-regulatory organizations with national scope, such as 
the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and the 
Mutual Fund Dealers Association.
20
 But more importantly, in 2003, 
Canada’s provincial and territorial securities commissions formally 
organized into the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”), a 
voluntary umbrella organization.
21
 The CSA’s stated objective is “to 
improve, coordinate and harmonize regulation of the Canadian capital 
markets.”
22
 This attempt at harmony through the CSA has taken two 
principal forms: (i) practical reciprocity–based, by means of the 
“passport system,” and (ii) regulatory coordination–based, by means of 
adoption of common rules and regulations. However, the attempts are 
largely ineffective in achieving true regulatory harmony. As a practical 
matter, the problem with voluntary cooperation is that any ostensibly 
national policy can be undone any time a CSA member province 
unilaterally changes its policy. 
 
 
20 BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP, SEC. LAW & PRACTICE §INT 9.1 — Purposes of the Act 
(3d ed. 2011). 
21 “Provincial securities regulators have been getting together for a number of years. 
[Their] first meetings can be traced back to the beginning of the 1930s. The CSA was re-
structured in September 2003 into a more formal organization.” E-mail from CSA 
Secretariat to Ian Wildgoose Brown (Apr. 13, 2011)) (on file with author). 
22 Rice, supra note 1, at 5. 
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    i. Practical reciprocity–based collaboration 
Under the passport system, a market participant’s registration with 
one commission effectively is given full faith and credit by 
commissions in the other participating jurisdictions. For example, the 
Nova Scotia Securities Commission will consider an issuer who 
successfully registers with the Saskatchewan Securities Commission to 
be registered under Nova Scotia securities law. The program’s intention 
is to allow market participants to have access to markets in all Canadian 
jurisdictions but deal only with their principal regulator.
23
 
However, “most stakeholders” (apart from the CSA itself) feel that 
the application of the passport system “is limited and it still falls short 
of what is required in today’s global marketplace.”
24
 The program is 
voluntary, and Ontario (Canada’s most populous province and home to 
Toronto, its largest economic hub) is not a participating jurisdiction.
25
 
Some market participants believe that the passport system, which 
requires virtual unanimity among provinces and territories, is “[too] 
slow to respond to new policy requirements as they arise.”
26
 Moreover, 
“a company wishing to raise money across Canada still may be required 
to pay fees to 13 jurisdictions,”
27
 and  be required to continue dealing 
with thirteen separate bureaucracies. These hurdles impose transaction 
costs on market participants trying to invest in Canada’s capital markets 
and potential systemic risk management issues on the capital markets as 
a whole. 
 
 
 
23 Id. at 7; see also Regulatory Cooperation – Pan-Canadian, CANADIAN SECURITIES 
ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=96 (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
24 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE HON. THOMAS HOCKIN, P.C. ET AL., 
EXPERT PANEL ON SECURITIES REGULATION, TO THE HON. JIM FLAHERTY, P.C., M.P., MINISTER 
OF FINANCE (CAN.) at 2 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“Final Report”), available at www.expertpanel.ca.   
25 Rice, supra note 1, at 7. Instead, the OSC makes its own decisions taking into 
consideration the decision of the applicant’s principal regulator. All other Canadian 
jurisdictions treat OSC decisions as definitive as though governed by the passport system. 
26 Kitching, supra note 12, at 8. 
27 Id. at 7 (quoting Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, Singing the Passport Blues: 
Perfect Harmony Eludes Provincial Securities Harmonization Efforts, 
4 MARKETCAPS @ GOWLINGS (Mar. 14, 2008)). 
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    ii. Regulatory coordination–based collaboration. 
The CSA also acts as a forum for coordinating regulatory 
collaboration among Canada’s thirteen securities regulators.
28
 This 
collaboration ultimately takes the form of instruments and policies 
governing both technical or procedural and substantive aspects of 
securities law. The instruments and policies are adopted either 
nationally (i.e., by all securities commissions) or multilaterally (i.e., by 
multiple but not all securities commissions).
29
 Instruments are adopted 
as rules by participating securities commissions; a given instrument, 
therefore, has the force of law in each jurisdiction that adopts it.
30
 
Policies are adopted as “guidelines” for market participants regarding a 
securities commission’s “perspective” on the subject of the policy; a 
given policy informs the commission’s enforcement of securities laws 
in its jurisdiction.
31
 
CSA members’ staff draft both instruments and policies 
collaboratively, but each proposed instrument or policy must pass a 
notice and comment period in each jurisdiction.
32
 Each then must be 
approved separately by each minister responsible for overseeing 
administration of his jurisdiction’s securities law.
33
 This problem is 
compounded by the fact that thirteen securities commissions then 
independently interpret, apply, and enforce each supposedly national 
component of the system. 
The nature of this regulatory collaboration based process has two 
negative effects. First, similar to the passport program, its voluntary 
nature creates opportunities for individual jurisdictions to except 
themselves from a given instrument or policy. The result is an 
institutionalized acceptance of disparate regulation and standards across 
the country. Second, its decentralized nature slows the adoption of 
national rules and policies. The potential for delays seriously inhibits 
 
28 Cf. Securities Law & Instruments – Instruments, Rules & Policies, ONTARIO 
SECURITIES COMMISSION, http://osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_irps_index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 11, 20011). 
29 See, e.g., Notice of National Policy 62-202 and Rescission of National Policy 
Statement No. 38: Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics, ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, 
(effective Aug. 4, 1997), http://osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62-
202_fnp.jsp  (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
30 Telephone Interview with an Enquiries Officer, OSC (Mar. 2, 2011). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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efficient regulation of Canada’s capital markets. 
34
 According to an 
expert panel convened in 2009 by the federal government (“Expert 
Panel”), Canada’s system is “too slow, too cumbersome, and too 
expensive.”
35
 The Expert Panel pointed out that “[a]t a time when speed 
counts, policy development is protracted, negatively affecting Canada’s 
ability to respond in a timely manner to national and global 
developments.”
36
 
     iii. Underlying tensions 
A fragmented system with a voluntary umbrella organization like 
the CSA makes securities regulation a chip in a larger federal-system 
negotiation game. The multi-party nature of the system stifles efficient 
substantive negotiation.
37
 It increases transaction costs associated with 
passing multijurisdictional instruments and policies. Additionally, the 
multi-party nature allows each province’s political system to have a 
separate voice and an effective veto on any unified national policy, 
rendering negotiation multidimensional and therefore more difficult. 
In general, where “there’s an audience behind [the negotiator] . . . 
value-creation [becomes] harder.”
38
 In the context of Canada’s federal 
government structure, where each party must answer to its own home 
jurisdiction, a comingling of securities regulation and federal politics 
allows federation-related concerns unrelated to securities law to seep 
into negotiations regarding even the relatively apolitical aspects of the 
system. “Longstanding disputes” can poison the negotiating 
atmosphere.
39
 In the Canadian context, any agreement must be struck in 
the shadow of other inter-jurisdictional federal politics.  As a result, 
“principled options generation becomes more risky”, and “it is more 
difficult to resolve even simple issues.”
40
 These concerns compound the 
 
34 Id. (describing adoption of National Instrument 31-103, proposed in Feb. 2007 and 
adopted in Sept. 2009 only after two notice and comment rounds). 
35 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE HON. THOMAS HOCKIN, P.C. ET 
AL., EXPERT PANEL ON SECURITIES REGULATION, TO THE HON. JIM FLAHERTY, P.C., M.P., 
MINISTER OF FINANCE (CAN.) at 2 (2009) (“Final Report”), available at www.expertpanel.ca. 
36 Id. 
37 The following discussion is based on Stephan P. Sonnenberg, Lecturer on Law, 
Harvard Law School, Lecture to Negotiation Workshop B1 at Harvard Law School: 
Multiparty Negotiations ( Mar. 3, 2011). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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problems that plague the attempts to forge regulatory unity on an ad hoc 
basis described above. 
d. National Securities Regulator 
Canada’s securities system has withstood many bouts of advocacy 
for a national securities regulator.
41
 Commentators and commissions 
repeatedly have asserted that a common securities regulator is “the only 
way of promoting timely enforcement of securities laws and eliminating 
overlap and confusion” among Canada’s jurisdictions.
42
 The federal 
government acted on this succession of expert opinions and drafted a 
national Securities Act in 2010. On April 13 and 14, 2011, the SCC 
heard arguments on the constitutionality of the Act.
43
 This legislative 
activity marked a strong move toward a national securities regulator, a 
move that could have begun to address the jurisdictional conflicts and 
confusion that currently characterize Canadian securities law. However, 
as noted above, the SCC held in an advisory opinion that the Act was 
unconstitutional as drafted.
44
 
A detailed consideration of the benefits of a national securities 
regulator is beyond the scope of this paper. However, and 
notwithstanding the opinion of the SCC, the arguments in favor of such 
a regulator seem to be grounded in market efficiency and protection of 
investors and other market participants, whereas the arguments against 
seem to be grounded in petty interprovincial politics and local economic 
entrenchment motives.  Moreover, the continued regulatory 
fragmentation that the SCC decision leaves untouched has an insidious 
impact on the regulation of takeover defenses. 
 
41 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND FINANCE (the “Porter 
Commission Report”) (1964); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN ONTARIO TO LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (the “Kimber Report”) 
(1965). 
42 Kitching, supra note 12, at 9.; see also MICHAEL E.J. PHELPS, CHAIR, WISE PERSON’S 
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA, DEPT. OF 
FINANCE CANADA, IT’S TIME (Dec. 17, 2003), available at www.wise-averties.ca; 
CRAWFORD PANEL ON A SINGLE CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATOR, MINISTRY OF 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR A CANADIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION: FINAL PAPER 
(2006), available at www.cba.ca/contents/files/misc/msc_crawfordreport_en.pdf. 
43 Nigel Campbell & Doug McLeod, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on National 
Securities Regulator, 2011–04 LITIGATION & DISPUTE RESOLUTION BULLETIN 1 (Apr. 2011), 
available at http://www.blakes.com/english/view_bulletin.asp?ID=4711. 
44 Reference re Securities Act, supra note 4. 
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2. Substantive Overview of Canada’s Regulation of Takeover 
Defenses 
Both the fragmented structure of Canada’s securities law system 
and the active role that Canada’s provincial securities commissions play 
in policing boards of directors in takeover situations contrast sharply 
with the American model of securities regulation. In the United States, 
securities law is governed federally by the SEC. The SEC’s mandate 
under the Securities Act of 1933 (known as the “‘33 Act”) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (known as the “‘34 Act”) is for the 
most part a regime based on disclosure.
45
 The only truly substantive 
work that those Acts do is to protect against insider trading and short-
swing profits.
46
 It is the state courts that govern substantive corporate 
law including the law of takeover defenses. 
The American system seems incoherent in a Canadian sense 
because the corporate law applicable in a given lawsuit depends on the 
implicated corporation’s state of incorporation. Whatever court, state or 
federal, is presiding over a given case must apply that state’s corporate 
law. For instance, Delaware follows the shareholder supremacy model 
outlined in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
47
 but 
Pennsylvania ostensibly follows a “stakeholder” model that is even 
more explicit than that mandated by Canadian corporate law.
48
 
However, the potential for incoherence in American corporate law 
is mitigated by two factors.
49
 First, most corporations are based in 
Delaware, and so most corporate law–related suits are brought in 
Delaware. This convergence on Delaware is based both on inertia 
(holdover from the regulatory “race to the bottom” of the nineteenth 
century) and on a regard for a state court judiciary generally considered 
expert in corporate law matters. Second, Wall Street essentially defaults 
 
45 Michael Wiseman, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Presentation at the Harvard Business 
Law Review Symposium (Apr. 2, 2011). 
46 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1934) (known as § 16(b) of the ‘34 Act) and 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (1951). 
47 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The shareholder supremacy model’s supremacy is 
debatable in light of subsequent Delaware jurisprudence. 
48 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (“Exercise of powers generally”) (1995); see Re 
BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.) (articulating a strong stakeholder model of fiduciary 
duties for Canadian boards of directors; discussed infra). 
49 Mark Gordon, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz LLP, Lecture to the Mergers & 
Acquisitions Workshop at Harvard Law School: Deal Protection and Topping Bids (Jan. 
10, 2011). 
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to a Delaware law standard in assessing any board’s actions regardless 
of the individual corporation’s state of incorporation. This decision 
seems to be based similarly on inertia, given Wall Street’s familiarity 
with Delaware law. As a result, directors typically follow the Delaware 
“shareholders first” jurisprudence for reputational reasons: directors 
want to be selected as directors of other companies in the future, and 
Wall Street’s judgment has enormous influence—both explicit and 
implicit—in those determinations. 
This level of de facto unity does not exist to the same extent in 
Canada. Though Toronto unequivocally is Canada’s business capital, 
companies are incorporated across Canada and decisions by any 
securities commission can affect the country’s business landscape. 
Although Canadian courts have built a robust body of corporate law to 
inform directors’ decisions regarding the corporation that shareholders 
entrust to them, Canada’s securities commissions arrogate to themselves 
decisions regarding the manner in which directors fulfill their fiduciary 
duties in practice. As discussed below, variation across jurisdiction at 
the edges of takeover defense jurisprudence, and potential conflict 
between substantive corporate law and substantive securities law, 
causes uncertainty and tension that is inefficient and undesirable. 
At a broader level, despite better protection of the shareholder 
franchise, Canada is more restrictive of the board’s use of takeover 
defenses such as a shareholder rights plan (“SRP”). This restrictive 
stance that Canadian securities law has allowed its securities 
commissions to adopt has two negative consequences. First, 
systemically undermining a board’s ability to erect effective takeover 
defenses means that hostile takeovers in Canada are too easy. Given that 
a transaction of some kind almost inevitably occurs as soon as the first 
bid is made, more M&A activity occurs than is optimal. Second, 
undermining existing corporate law constraints on boards in the name of 
some version—one unitary vision—of shareholder interest undermines 
board management authority. This grant of authority to the board is the 
foundation of corporate common law. It should not be revoked lightly. 
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a. Introduction: Sources of Law 
National Policy 62-202 – Takeover Bids – Defensive Tactics 
articulates the two principles that underlie Canadian securities law 
relating to takeover defenses.
50
 First, Canada has determined that 
unrestricted auctions produce the most desirable results in takeover bid 
situations.
51
 Second, Canada has determined that shareholders of the 
target of a hostile bid generally should be free to make a fully informed 
decision to determine the ultimate outcome of that bid.
52
 
Regulation of takeover defenses by Canadian securities 
commissions historically has followed these two principles. 
Accordingly, the target’s board may use defensive tactics (e.g., a SRP
53
) 
in a genuine attempt to obtain a better bid—i.e., to create an auction to 
improve the price that shareholders will receive for their shares. 
However, tactics that are likely either to deny or to severely limit the 
shareholders’ ability to respond to a takeover bid prompt securities 
commissions to take sua sponte regulatory action against the target and 
its board, or to accept an application by the hostile bidder.
54
 The 
regulatory action typical in such circumstances is a “cease-trade” order 
that freezes trading in shares of the target’s stock (or rights issued 
pursuant to a SRP).
55
 
 
 
50 National Policy 62-202, Takeover Bids – Defensive Tactics, SEC. POLICY 
65648519006 (into force Aug. 4,  1997), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62-202_fnp.jsp (“NP 62-202”). 
51 NP 62-202, § 1.1(5). 
52 Re Canadian Jorex Ltd., [1992] 15 O.S.C. Bull. 257 (Can.), para. 16 (“[W]e have 
every confidence that the shareholders of a target company will ultimately be quite able to 
decide for themselves, with the benefit of the advice they receive from the target board and 
others, including their own advisers, whether or not to dispose of their shares and, if so, at 
what price and on what terms. And to us the public interest lies in allowing them to do just 
that.”); see also David Surat & Paul A.D. Mingay, OSC allows shareholder rights plan to 
stand, INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFICE: CORPORATE FINANCE/M&A – CANADA, July 8, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Detail.aspx?r=18930&redir=1. 
53 Ralph Shay, In Alberta and Now Ontario: There Comes a Time When a Poison Pill 
Gets to Stay, 2009–06 SECURITIES NEWSLETTER 1–2 (June 2009). When the SRP first 
arrived in Canada a few years after Martin Lipton invented it, securities commissions did 
not employ National Policy 38 (predecessor to NP 62-202) to restrict their adoption by 
Canadian companies. 
54 NP 62-202, § 1.1(2), (5), (6); see also BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP, TAKE-OVER 
BIDS AND ISSUER BIDS: DEFENCES TO UNFRIENDLY TAKE-OVER BIDS: NATIONAL POLICY 62-
202, SEC. LAW & PRACTICE § 20.23.2 (3d ed. 2011).  
55 Shay, supra note 54. 
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The commission’s regulatory action is based on the broad and 
ambiguous “public interest jurisdiction” that each of Canada’s securities 
statutes grants to its securities commission.
56
 This jurisdiction 
effectively attaches at the commission’s discretion, even where there 
has been no express violation of the securities laws.
57
 In such cases, the 
commission applies the principles of the appropriate national policy, 
ostensibly always prioritising the interests of shareholders; in cases of 
potentially inappropriate takeover defenses, the commission looks to 
NP 62-202.
58
 Commissions keep a close eye on situations where a target 
board uses a SRP—corporate law’s most controversial takeover 
defense.
59
 
b. Basic SRP Jurisprudence: Legal Framework 
i. The OSC decides Canadian Jorex. 
The OSC set the benchmark for treatment of the SRP in Re 
Canadian Jorex Ltd., heard in December 1991. In its decision, the 
Canadian Jorex panel stated that: 
. . . the only question we really had to decide was whether the [SRP] 
had served its purpose in facilitating an auction for Jorex, and so 
ought to be discontinued as against the Mannville bid to let the 
shareholders decide which bid they preferred (if, indeed they wished 
to accept either one). All seemed to agree . . . that “there comes a 
time when the pill has got to go.” The only real issue before us, 
then . . . was “when does the pill go.”
60
 
The Canadian Jorex panel thereby acknowledged the two 
principles underlying Canadian securities law relating to takeover 
defenses employed by a target board. The board’s purpose in instituting 
 
56 See, e.g., OSA § 127(1) (“The Commission may make one or more of the following 
orders if in its opinion it is in the public interest to make the order or orders . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
57 Ralph Shay, Take-over Defences and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Can National 
Policy 62-202 and the BCE Decision Live Side by Side?, 2009–12 SECURITIES NEWSLETTER 
1–2 (Dec. 2009); Telephone Interview with an Enquiries Officer, OSC (416-593-8314) 
(Mar. 2, 2011, 14:03). 
58 Interview with Enquiries Officer, supra note 47. 
59 See Kevin J. Thomson et al., When “No” Means “Maybe”—the State of the “Just 
Say No” Defence in Canada, THE 2011 LEXPERT/AMERICAN LAWYER GUIDE TO THE 
LEADING 500 LAWYERS IN CANADA A74 (2011), available at 
www.dwpv.com/images/Article_-_When_No_Means_Maybe.pdf. 
60 15 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 10. 
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a SRP must be to “facilitat[e] an auction”; once the SRP has served this 
purpose, it is time for the SRP “to go” and for the target shareholders to 
decide.
61
 The notion that a SRP should expire, and that it should be the 
securities commission that makes that determination, is the defining 
feature of the Canadian Jorex decision. This feature set the course for 
subsequent jurisprudence in Canada regarding takeover defenses in 
general and SRPs in particular. 
The panel based its pro-shareholder paradigm on a conception of 
shareholders as sophisticated players in the capital markets. The panel 
explicitly voiced its confidence in shareholders’ ability “to exercise one 
of the fundamental rights of share ownership—the ability to dispose of 
shares as one wishes.”
62
 The Canadian Jorex panel expressly rejected 
the proposal that the decision whether a hostile bid is acceptable should 
be left in the hands of the target board or its independent committee and 
their professional advisors: 
[W]e have every confidence that the shareholders of a target 
company will ultimately be quite able to decide for themselves, with 
the benefit of the advice they receive from the target board and 
others, including their own advisers, whether or not to dispose of 
their shares and, if so, at what price and on what terms. And to us the 
public interest lies in allowing them to do just that.
63
 
Canada’s securities commissions historically followed the OSC’s 
Canadian Jorex paradigm with respect to NP 62-202. Commissions 
applied NP 62-202 consistently as against targets that instituted SRPs: 
“In the roughly 20 cases from 1991 to 2007, the only unpredictable 
aspect was the question of whether the pill would be cease traded 
immediately or a few weeks hence.”
64
 This consistency is based in an 
intent to apply a consistent interpretation of NP 62-202. Securities 
commissions have recognized that the law informs the behavior of 
market participants: “The rules of the game should be clear and 
consistently applied to encourage bidders to come forward.”
65
 
 
 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at para. 15. 
63 Id. at para. 16. 
64 Shay, supra note 54, at 1. 
65 Re Cara Operations Ltd., [2002] 25 O.S.C. Bull. 7997, para. 58 (Can.). 
WILDGOOSE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2012  2:00 PM 
2012  AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON CANADIAN POISON PILL 313 
ii. Royal Host factors 
Securities commissions have great flexibility and discretion in 
analyzing a board’s conduct.
66
 But a result of securities commissions’ 
philosophy of consistency described above, case law interpreting 
NP 62-202 in the context of a review of a SRP converged on a number 
of factors that a commission considers in making its fact-specific 
determination.
67
 These factors include, with regard to— 
 
The company: 
 
 The size and complexity of the target company; and 
 Other defensive tactics, if any, implemented by the target 
company. 
 
The SRP: 
 
 When the SRP was adopted; 
 Whether shareholder approval of the SRP was obtained; 
and 
 Whether there is broad shareholder support for the 
continued operation of the SRP. 
 
The bid: 
 
 The length of time since the bid was announced and made; 
 The nature of the bid, including whether it is coercive or 
unfair to the shareholders of the target company; and 
 The likelihood that the bid will not be extended if the SRP 
is not terminated. 
 
 
 
 
66 Cf. Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., [2010] 33 O.S.C. Bull. 11385, para. 29 (Can.) 
(“Notwithstanding the principles referred to above, at the end of the day, there is no one test 
or consideration that constitutes the ‘holy grail’ when deciding whether a rights plan should 
remain in place or be cease traded.”). 
67 Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 O.S.C. Bull. 7819, para. 69 
(Can.) (joint decision with ASC and BCSC). 
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The market: 
 
 The steps taken by the target company to find an 
alternative bid or transaction that would be better for the 
shareholders; 
 The number of potential, viable offerors; and 
 The likelihood that, if given further time, the target 
company will be able to find a better bid or transaction. 
 
The Royal Host factors also track the two principles underlying 
Canadian securities law relating to takeover defenses employed by a 
target board. A board likely will be subject to regulatory action where 
that board is well-protected by preclusive takeover defenses 
(particularly those that have not been approved by the target’s 
shareholders) and yet has not attempted to leverage those defenses to 
initiate an auction or improve the original offer. In such circumstances, 
a securities commission will intervene on behalf of the target’s 
shareholders, basing its intervention on NP 62-202. 
Securities commissions have applied more stringent scrutiny to 
responsive defensive tactics.
68
 Conduct that is subjected to this more 
stringent scrutiny includes so-called “tactical” SRPs (i.e., a SRP that is 
“adopted by a target board in the face of a bid, without shareholder 
approval”).
69
 Where a target board employs a tactical SRP in response to 
a bid, the board must demonstrate to the commission that the SRP was 
necessary “because of the coercive nature of the bid or some other very 
substantial unfairness or impropriety.”
70
 The commission then weighs 
the board’s arguments in light of the other Royal Host factors and 
determines whether to cease-trade the rights issued pursuant to the SRP.  
In short, the commission expressly shifts the business judgment burden 
of proof from the shareholders to the board where the board uses a 
tactical SRP. By contrast, Canadian courts respect the board’s business 
judgment even where the target is in play: the duties of the target board 
do not change.
71
 
 
68 See, e.g., Royal Host supra note 68 (considering the date the SRP was adopted 
relative to the date of the bid).  
69 Id. at para. 54. 
70 Id. at para. 55 (quoting Re CW Shareholdings Inc. and WIC Western International 
Communications Ltd., [1998] 21 O.S.C. Bull. 2899, 2908 (Can.)).  
71 Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R.3d 177, para. 
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This more stringent scrutiny is grounded in the express language of 
NP 62-202.
72
 Application of this policy has created explicit incentives 
for corporations to avoid “lame duck” defenses.
73
 More specifically, it 
creates explicit incentives for a corporation to adopt a SRP and to have 
it approved by its shareholders—both well in advance of a bid. This 
“reward” for shareholder approval addresses an issue commonly 
encountered in the United States, whereby corporations embed takeover 
defenses in their charter that the shareholders did not contract for.
74
 
However, it also affords the board less leeway in responding to a given 
hostile bid. 
     iii. Target board’s fiduciary duties 
Given that securities commissions intervene in boards’ decisions 
where they implicate most clearly their fiduciary duties, Canadian 
securities law effectively incorporates, and sometimes overlaps with, 
Canadian corporate law.
75
 NP 62-202 and its associated case law purport 
to respect the target board’s business judgment in a takeover situation—
where appropriate. In NP 62-202, the CSA determined that it would 
have been “inappropriate to specify a code of conduct for directors of a 
target company” in addition to their duties of care and loyalty as 
required by corporate law.
76
  However, NP 62-202 expressly identifies 
the “possibility that the interests of management of the target company 
 
36 (Ont. Can.). 
72 Shay, supra note 54, at 2; see NP 62-202, § 1.1(4). 
73 Cf. Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., Harvard Law School, Lecture to Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Splitups at Harvard Law School: Who Decides? Episode I (Sept. 
28, 2010) (describing “lame duck” defenses as those defenses erected during or immediately 
preceding a hostile bid). The TSX has always required that any SRP adopted by a TSX-
listed company be approved by the corporation’s shareholders within six months of the 
SRP’s adoption. See also Shay, supra note 43 at 2. However, as discussed above, 
satisfaction (or not) of this requirement usually has been only one of the many factors that a 
securities commission considers in assessing the validity of a SRP, tactical or not. And 
anyway most takeover battles are over well before the six-month deadline for TSX listing 
requirements. 
74 Interview with John C. Coates IV, Harvard Law School (Mar. 8, 2011). This situation 
can arise when the charter is amended unilaterally after a merger or in a reorganisation of 
the corporation, or when the corporation first goes public. 
75 Re Lions Gate Entertainment Corp., 2010 BCSECCOM 233, para. 33 (Can.) (citing 
to Re BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.) (asserting that a board has a fiduciary duty “to 
act in the best interests of the corporation”).  
76 NP 62-202 § 1.1(3). 
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will differ from those of its shareholders.”
77
 This mistrust of 
management and the board is the foundational assumption that 
Canadian securities commissions rely on to inform and to justify their 
interventionist paradigm. 
c. Current State of the Law Regarding SRPs: Aberrations and 
Turmoil 
Recent SRP jurisprudence for the most part has followed and 
reaffirmed the interventionist paradigm established in Canadian Jorex 
and NP 62-202. In 2010, the BCSC and the OSC each cease-traded a 
SRP in two high-profile decisions—Re Lions Gate Entertainment 
Corp.
78
 and Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp.,
79
 respectively. Both panels 
applied traditional Canadian principles regarding takeover defenses. 
Their decisions suggest that the core of those principles remains well-
established among Canada’s securities commissions. However, both 
panels expressly responded to prior case law that took a different 
approach to one particular issue in the law of takeover defenses: the 
ability of a target board to “just say no” in the face of a hostile bid and 
rely on a SRP to maintain the status quo. 
80
 
Commentators point out that inconsistencies and uncertainties 
continue to exist at the fringes of the law governing the use of a SRP in 
the hostile takeover context. Notwithstanding their agreement on core 
principles of securities law, the Lions Gate case and the Baffinland case 
are not entirely coterminous regarding the ability of a board to “just say 
no” in certain circumstances. Specifically, the effect of a shareholder 
vote on the legitimacy of a SRP where the board does not search for 
alternative transactions remains uncertain in Ontario.
81
 And the prior 
case law that those cases addressed continues to represent an alternative, 
and some would say more enlightened,
82
 take on the issue. That being 
 
77 Id. at § 1.1(1). 
78 2010 BCSECCOM 233 (Can.). 
79 [2010] 33 O.S.C. Bull. 11385 (Can.). 
80 Re Neo Material Technologies, [2009] 32 O.S.C. Bull. 6941 (Can.) and Re Pulse 
Data Systems, [2007] 39 B.L.R. (4th) 138 (ASC Can.). 
81 See, e.g., Julius Melnitzer, Baffinland helps clear air on poison pills, LAW TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 2010 (quoting Thomas Yeo, Torys LLP), 
http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201012208114/Headline-News/Baffinland-helps-clear-air-
on-poison-pills. 
82 Cf. Kevin Marron, “Poison pill” policies all over the map, INVESTMENT EXECUTIVE, 
Dec. 06, 2010 (quoting Kevin Thomson, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP), 
http://www.investmentexecutive.com/client/en/News/DetailNews.asp?id=56068&pg=1&Id
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said, even this more enlightened view is insufficient: Canadian 
securities law takes for granted that securities commissions have the 
power to, and should, intervene directly in the affairs of the corporation 
in a takeover situation. 
    i. The BCSC decides Lions Gate, reiterates the auction principle 
In Lions Gate, the BCSC held that individual shareholders must be 
given the opportunity to respond to a hostile bid directly by deciding 
whether to tender their shares.
83
 The majority of the Lions Gate panel 
determined that shareholders cannot collectively tie their own hands by 
voting to approve an SRP where the board has not taken steps to seek 
any competitive bid or alternative transaction for the target’s 
shareholders.
84
 As a result of this holding, a board cannot use an SRP to 
maintain the status quo and continue to pursue its existing business plan 
after determining it to be in the best interests of the corporation, even 
where they submit that decision to shareholders for an informed 
uncoerced vote. 
The majority’s decision conceded that in general shareholder 
ratification of an SRP can be relevant under Royal Host.
85
 Yet the panel 
asserted that such ratification is not determinative and is only relevant 
“in the context of what the SRPs were for”; i.e., allowing the board time 
and leverage to initiate an auction.
86
 The panel held that evidence of 
shareholder ratification is only relevant where the target board will use 
the SRP to buy additional time to solicit a competing bid or other 
superior transaction.
87
 Since the Lions Gate board had determined to 
take no steps to seek such an alternative bid or transaction,
88
 the majority 
of the panel concluded that the issue of shareholder approval of the SRP 
had been rendered moot.
89
 This holding thereby reaffirmed the basic 
tenet of Canadian securities law regarding the purpose of the SRP. The 
target board has an obligation eventually to relent in the face of a 
takeover bid, but also to maximize shareholder value by means of an 
 
Section=27&IdPub=204. 
83 Lions Gate, 2010 BCSECCOM at paras. 24, 29. 
84  Id. at paras. 55–57. 
85 Id. at para 53. 
86 Id. at para. 56 
87 Id. at paras. 53–58. 
88 Id. at paras. 16, 48. 
89 Lions Gate, 2010 BCSECCOM at para. 54. 
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auction. 
     ii. The OSC decides Baffinland, reiterates the shareholder 
choice principle 
In Baffinland, the OSC reiterated the holding in Canadian Jorex 
and reaffirmed that case as good law in Ontario. In so doing, the 
Baffinland panel rendered the OSC’s position on SRPs relatively clear: 
an SRP is contrary to shareholder interests unless it is tied to a “genuine 
attempt to obtain a better bid.”
90
 The OSC expressly invoked the 
Canadian Jorex case, stating that 
. . . it is generally time for a shareholder rights plan “to go” when the 
[SRP] has served its purpose by facilitating an auction, encouraging 
competing bids or otherwise maximizing shareholder value. A [SRP] 
will be cease traded where it is unlikely to achieve any further 
benefits for shareholders.
91
 
The Baffinland panel then cited Canadian Jorex to express 
confidence in shareholders’ ability to decide how to dispose of their 
shares.
92
 The Baffinland panel thereby reaffirmed a conception of 
shareholders as sophisticated entities “capable of making the relevant 
choices” with regard to competing bids for their shares,
93
 just as the 
Canadian Jorex panel had twenty years earlier. 
d. Aberration in SRP Jurisprudence: 2007–10 
The specific holdings in the Baffinland case and the Lions Gate 
case must be understood as a direct response to post-2007 developments 
in SRP jurisprudence. In 2007 and 2009, the ASC and the OSC each 
declined to cease-trade an SRP in two high-profile decisions—Re Pulse 
Data Inc.
94
 and Re Neo Material Technologies Inc.,
95
 respectively. Both 
panels appeared to take a nontraditional approach to the question of 
whether a board can “just say no” in certain circumstances. Both panels 
respected the decision of a board acting with the authority of its 
shareholders but without any intent to create an auction by soliciting 
competing bids. 
 
90 Melnitzer, supra note 83. 
91 33 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 26.  
92 Id. at para. 27 (citing Canadian Jorex, para. 15). 
93 Id. at paras. 54–55. 
94 [2007] 39 B.L.R. (4th) 138 (ASC Can.). 
95 [2009] 32 O.S.C. Bull. 6941 (Can.). 
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In Pulse Data, the ASC declined to cease-trade an SRP instituted 
as the only response to a hostile takeover bid. The panel identified the 
protection of the bona fide interests of the target shareholders as its 
primary consideration in evaluating the Pulse Data SRP.
96
 The panel 
determined that the Pulse Data shareholders had approved the SRP 
shortly before the bid, with the benefit of “an extraordinary amount of 
information on which to evaluate the Rights Plan in the face of the 
[Seitel] offer.”
97
  Furthermore, the ASC expressed a reluctance to 
interfere with a decision reached by a board exercising its fiduciary duty 
to act in the best interest of shareholders.
98
 
In Neo, the OSC declined to cease-trade a SRP on similar grounds 
based on similar facts. First, the panel determined that: 
. . . there is no evidence that the process undertaken by the Neo 
Board to evaluate and respond to the Pala Offer, including the 
decision to implement the Second [SRP], was not carried out in what 
the Neo Board determined to be the best interests of the corporation 
and of the Neo shareholders, as a whole . . . .
99
 
Second, the panel referred to (i) the fact that an “overwhelming 
majority” of Neo’s shareholders approved the SRP, and (ii) the fact that 
Neo’s shareholders were adequately informed and free from coercion.
100
 
Both panels therefore seemed to apply a different test from the 
traditional application of NP 62-202 and the Royal Host factors. In 
neither case did the target board take any steps to seek out alternative 
transactions. But in each case, the panel determined that the target 
shareholders’ recent informed and overwhelming approval of the SRP 
constituted the shareholders’ express rejection of the offer.
101
 This 
reasoning exemplifies a conception of the board as protecting the 
shareholders from themselves, thereby counteracting the collective 
action problem that faces every widely-held corporation in a hostile bid 
situation.
102
 Additionally, both panels based their decisions in part on the 
 
96  Pulse Data, 39 B.L.R. at para 93. 
97  Id. at para. 101. 
98 Id. at para. 101(e). 
99 32 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 18(b). 
100 Id. at para. 18(c)–(e). 
101 Allan Coleman and Cameron A. MacDonald, The Path Forward: Poison Pills in 
Canada After Pulse Data, Neo, and Lions Gate, OSLER HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP – E-
REVIEWS: CORPORATE REVIEW (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.osler.com/ 
newsresources/Details.aspx?id=2822&col=. 
102 See Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., supra note 74. 
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boards’ exercise of their fiduciary duties under corporate law. The 
panels referred to the adequate process followed by the board and the 
efforts to ensure both board and shareholders were adequately informed. 
In particular, the Neo panel specifically referred to the SCC’s recent 
formulation of the business judgment rule:
103
 under the BCE case, the 
board’s fiduciary duties in the face of a hostile bid are not limited solely 
to maximizing short-term profit or share value, and instead can be 
exercised for the broader purpose of protecting the long-term interests 
of shareholders.
104
 The two panels thereby broke with conventional 
securities law doctrine, but acted in harmony with Canadian corporate 
common law. 
e. Summation of Recent Jurisprudence: 2007–10 
Commentators generally regard these recent decisions as 
addressing the availability of the Nancy Reagan defense to the boards of 
Canadian companies—i.e., whether a target board may “just say no” in 
the face of a hostile bid and rely on an SRP to maintain the status quo. 
Historically, boards have not been permitted to do so notwithstanding 
an informed determination that maintaining the status quo would be in 
the best interest of the corporation. The BCSC maintained that position 
even in the face of a shareholder vote ratifying that informed 
determination.
105
 However, the OSC did not expressly state a position 
regarding the effect of a shareholder vote on a SRP where the board 
admitted it was not searching for alternatives.
106
 There is some question 
whether Neo remains good law on that issue in Ontario. There is no 
question that Pulse Data remains good law in Alberta. 
Where “the success or failure of a hostile takeover bid may well 
depend largely on the province in which the head office of the target 
company is located,”
107
 a particular securities commission’s silence on a 
particular salient aspect of SRP jurisprudence can cause unnecessary 
confusion among companies and their boards and investors. Such a 
“dichotomy in the regulatory system in Canada with regard to the 
 
103 Neo, 32 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 107. 
104 BCE, 3 S.C.R. at para. 38. 
105 Lions Gate, 2010 BCSECCOM at para 55 
106 Melnitzer, supra note 83. 
107 Kevin Marron, “Poison pill” policies all over the map, INVESTMENT EXECUTIVE, 
 Dec. 6, 2010 (quoting Kevin Thomson, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP), 
http://www.investmentexecutive.com/client/en/News/DetailNews.asp?id=56068&pg=1&Id
Section=27&IdPub=204. 
WILDGOOSE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2012  2:00 PM 
2012  AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON CANADIAN POISON PILL 321 
regulation of hostile change-of-control transactions” undermines 
investor confidence and inhibits the efficient functioning of Canada’s 
capital markets.
108
 
These interventionist approaches to a board’s exercise of its 
fiduciary duties raise concerns about the way boards are regulated in the 
context of a takeover bid under current Canadian securities law. But 
even allowing shareholders to ratify the board’s decision in a 
shareholder vote (as was the case in Neo and Pulse Data) is not an 
adequately hands-off approach. Commissions should allow boards the 
discretion to act in what they determine to be the best interest of the 
corporation. They should recognize that boards are constrained by their 
fiduciary duties and by free exercise of the shareholder franchise. 
f. Potential Conflict Between Provincial Securities Law and 
Corporate Law Principles of Fiduciary Duty 
Securities commission decisions before the Neo case have raised 
the tension that exists in Canada between securities law and corporate 
law. For example, in Re Tarxien Corp., the OSC cease-traded an SRP 
even though the panel found no evidence that the defendant board had 
acted other than in what the directors believed to be the shareholders’ 
best interests.
109
 The panel determined that “whether the Directors of 
Tarxien had exercised their fiduciary duties in setting up the [SRP]” was 
not a “relevant [consideration] for the decision [that they] had to 
make.”
110
 This holding explicitly acknowledges that a different set of 
imperatives drives securities commissions, which necessarily influences 
boards. 
However, from the perspective of a board of directors, the SCC’s 
determination of the board’s fiduciary duty is a highly relevant 
consideration for the decisions that they have to make. The Court’s 
determination in the BCE case directly impacts the fiduciary duty 
calculus in the context of takeover defense strategies. In the BCE case, 
the Court held that: 
[t]he fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, 
contextual concept. It is not confined to short-term profit or share 
value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the 
long-term interests of the corporation. The content of this duty varies 
 
108 Id. 
109 Re Tarxien Corp., [1996] 19 O.S.C. Bull. 6913, para. 25 (Can.). 
110 Id.  
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with the situation at hand. At a minimum, it requires the directors to 
ensure that the corporation meets its statutory obligations. But, 
depending on the context, there may also be other requirements. In 
any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is mandatory; 
directors must look to what is in the best interests of the 
corporation.
111
 
This passage captures the tension between the board’s duty to the 
corporation and the securities commission’s public interest in 
shareholder well-being. Securities commissions, interpreting NP 62-
202, focus exclusively on shareholder interests in the short term. On the 
other hand, the board must consider the long-term interest of the 
corporation as a whole, and is not subject to the same shareholder-
primacy Revlon duties as in the United States.
112
 “There is no principle 
[in Canadian corporate law] that one set of interests—for example the 
interests of shareholders—should prevail over another set of 
interests.”
113
 In fact, this conception of the board’s fiduciary duties 
“could be seen to obligate a board of directors to embark on a course of 
action that is inconsistent with NP 62-202”
114
 and its inherent skepticism 
toward a board’s business judgment in a takeover context—which 
skepticism is contrary to Canadian corporate common law. 
Securities commissions have taken this skeptical stance to heart. 
For example, in Re Consolidated Properties Ltd., the OSC stated that: 
[i]f there appears to be a real and substantial possibility that, given a 
reasonable period of further time, the board of the target corporation 
can increase shareholder choice and maximize shareholder value, 
then, absent some other compelling reason requiring the termination 
of the [SRP] in the interests of shareholders, it seems to us that the 
Commission should allow the [SRP] to function for such further 
period, so as to allow management and the board to continue to fulfil 
their fiduciary duties.
115
 
 
 
 
111 BCE, 3 S.C.R. at para. 38. 
112 Id. at para. 87 (“the Revlon line of cases has not displaced the fundamental rule that 
the duty of directors cannot be confined to particular priority rules, but is rather a function 
of business judgment of what is in the best interest of the corporation, in the particular 
situation it faces.”). 
113 Id. at para. 84. 
114 Shay, supra note 58, at 3. (emphasis added). 
115 [2000] 23 O.S.C. Bull. 7981, para. 35 (Can.) (citing Re MDC Corp. and Regal 
Greetings and Gifts Inc.,  [1994] 17 O.S.C. Bull. 4971, 4979 (Can.)). 
WILDGOOSE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2012  2:00 PM 
2012  AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON CANADIAN POISON PILL 323 
The Consolidated Properties panel thereby acknowledged the role 
that corporate law fiduciary duties play in guiding the target board’s 
decision-making regarding a SRP or other takeover defenses. But the 
panel—acting with reference to NP 62-202—expressly substituted its 
own judgment for that of the board’s regarding the likelihood that the 
board “can increase shareholder choice and maximize shareholder 
value.”
116
 Similarly, the panel reserved to itself the determination of 
what would constitute a “reasonable period of further time” and what 
would constitute a “compelling reason requiring the termination of the 
[SRP].”
117
 
In overseeing the board’s fulfillment of their fiduciary duties, the 
panel made its own independent assessment of the circumstances of the 
takeover contest and applied its own judgment to those circumstances. 
This tradition of exercising independent assessment and judgment was 
established in the Canadian Jorex case.
118
 It is central to the regulatory 
function that Canadian securities commissions serve in constraining 
target board action in the face of a hostile takeover bid. Such a tradition 
underlying a system of securities regulation betrays (i) an intense 
mistrust of the target board’s willingness to fulfill its fiduciary duties in 
a takeover situation and (ii) a lack of faith in the statutory regime that 
Canada’s legislatures have created to protect the shareholder franchise. 
Instead, this tradition represents a reliance on active regulatory bodies to 
make the necessary determinations and oversee, on behalf of the 
corporation’s shareholders, the board’s actions on behalf of those 
shareholders. However, that well-established tradition of independent 
judgment runs contrary to a fundamental principle in both Canadian and 
American corporate law: that directors and shareholders should decide, 
not courts nor regulators. 
The tension between court and securities commission played out in 
Neo and subsequent case law. Based on that case law, Canada’s 
securities commissions seem to have settled on a position that 
undermines the Supreme Court’s conception of fiduciary duty in 
situations where the exercise of those duties is most context-specific 
and where the tension between short-term and long-term value is cast in 
starkest relief. 
 
 
116 Id 
117 Id. 
118 See text accompanying notes 61–66. 
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Canada’s securities commissions might have let directors make 
those important determinations according to fiduciary duties that are 
determined and enforced by courts and prosecuted by shareholders. 
Instead, commissions insert themselves into the mix and impose their 
own conception of what the best outcome might be in a hostile bid 
situation. Commissions act based on their opinion of the outcome that 
they believe to be in the “public interest” despite having no robust 
incentives to determine definitively what that public interest is in any 
given situation. As a result, they end up imposing a tight and largely 
inflexible
119
 timeline in which a besieged board is expected to defend its 
shareholders from the siren song of a bid premium—and its promise of 
immediate gratification for shareholders, many of whom are operating 
on such thin margins that locking in any gain is a victory—with words 
alone. 
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
1. Introduction 
a. Canada, the United States, and the Interco case 
Despite better protection of the shareholder franchise, Canada is 
more restrictive of boards’ use of takeover defenses. Canada’s system is 
essentially identical to the approach to takeover defenses outlined in 
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc.
120
 In Interco, Chancellor 
Allen held that a board’s good faith determination that an offer was 
inadequate could justify leaving a takeover defense such as an SRP in 
place for some “period” of time while the board worked to protect 
shareholder interests.
121
 Chancellor Allen’s model provided that a board 
could protect shareholder interests by negotiating with the bidder, 
seeking out an alternative transaction, or presenting an alternative of its 
own to the shareholders.
122
 But “[o]nce that period has closed . . . and 
[the board] has taken such time as it required in good faith to arrange an 
alternative value-maximizing transaction, then, in most instances, the 
legitimate role of the [SRP] in the context of a non-coercive offer will 
 
119 Thomson et al., supra note 49 (“Generally, the commissions will cease trade the pill 
somewhere in the range of 45 to 70 days after the start of the unsolicited bid.”). 
120 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
121 Id. at 798 
122 Id. 
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have been fully satisfied.”
123
 The Delaware Supreme Court gave that 
case severely negative treatment in Paramount Communications Inc. v. 
Time Inc.
124
 As a result, subsequent American jurisprudence took a 
different path from the one outlined in the Interco case.
125
 Yet it is the 
Interco paradigm that underlies the Canadian Jorex approach to 
takeover defenses. 
Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court might consider 
Canada’s Interco-like approach to be more enlightened and forward-
looking than the United States’ “paternalistic model” of shareholder 
protection in light of the increasing sophistication of shareholders that 
he sees in modern capital markets.
126
 Justice Jacobs’s observations apply 
equally, if not more, in Canada. In Canada, an even more significant 
percentage of shareholders in corporations across the capital markets 
are, or are represented by, sophisticated institutional shareholders.
127
 But 
though shareholders in both countries have “[come] to be viewed as 
highly sophisticated investors with no need of protection by boards, and 
only to a limited extent by courts,”
128
 Delaware law has retained the 
concept of substantive coercion and its attendant permission of board 
discretion in the face of takeover bids. Since the Time case Delaware 
courts have not independently determined whether an SRP has expired 
and therefore should be struck down. As recently confirmed in the 
Airgas case
129
 (foreshadowed by, inter alia, the Delaware District 
Court’s opinion in Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs. Inc.
130
), the 
board of directors of a target corporation is entitled to use an SRP for as 
long a period of time as the board deems warranted. This stance 
generally persists notwithstanding Delaware decisions such as the 
 
123 Id. 
124 571 A.2d 1140, 1152–53 (Del. 1990) (though never expressly overruled it as the 
Interco case did not come before that court).  
125 See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems. Inc. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
126 Jack B. Jacobs, Paradigm Shifts in American Corporate Governance Law: A 
Quarter Century of Experience, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 2 (Sept./Oct. 2007). 
127 See  Hansell, et al., The Quality of the Shareholder Vote in Canada 6, Note 3 (Davies 
Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP, Discussion Paper) (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://www.dwpv.com/Sites/shareholdervoting/media/The-Quality-of-the-Shareholder-Vote-
in-Canad.pdf  (“According to Bloomberg, as of August 2010, the average holding by 
institutional investors in S&P/TSX 60 Index companies is 56.79%.”). 
128 Jacobs, supra note 128, at 3. 
129 Airgas, 16 A.3d at 48. 
130 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995). 
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Chesapeake case and the Topps case,
131
 and notwithstanding Chancellor 
Chandler’s own apparent ambivalence about the wisdom of the 
doctrine. 
Instead, as Justice Jacobs writes, the American corporate law 
system “relies heavily upon shareholder voting as the basis to legitimize 
corporate action” by directors who decide “how to deploy billions of 
dollars of assets that the directors do not own.”
132
 In the United States, 
the board is limited primarily by the constraints imposed by the 
shareholder franchise, which reinforces the U.S.’s “representative 
democracy” model of corporate governance. This powerful motif has 
run through Delaware case law since the Blasius case—even though 
Delaware’s protections of the shareholder franchise are less robust than 
those in Canada. Specifically, Delaware General Corporation Law 
§ 141(d) permits classified boards of directors.
133
 Further,Delaware case 
law has permitted implicit assaults on the shareholder franchise, 
notwithstanding the equitable imperatives of the Blasius case.
134
 
b. Canada and the Shareholder Franchise; Proposal 
These techniques, permitted and even common in the U.S.,
135
 are 
 
131 Jacobs, supra note 128, at 3 (citing Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that if shareholders are smart enough to decide whether to invest in 
a particular company without board intervention, then they should be regarded as intelligent 
enough to decide whether to exit that investment), and In re The Topps Co. Shareholder 
Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007) (ordering target company to amend its proxy statement 
to include material facts that would enable the target shareholders to choose between the 
two competing offers on an informed basis, on the basis that the target’s highly 
sophisticated shareholders could decide for themselves whether or not to tender (and into 
which offer to tender) so long as they had adequate information).  
132 Id. at 4 (citing Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 
(Del. Ch. 1988), and stating parenthetically that “[t]he shareholder franchise is the 
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
133 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011). 
134 See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388–89 (Del. 1995). In 
Unitrin, the court allowed the Unitrin board to put in a SRP then to “thin the herd” by 
repurchasing (likely) antagonistic votes, thereby tilting the playing field steeply in their 
favor. Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., Harvard Law School, Lecture to Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Splitups at Harvard Law School: The Death of “Enhanced” Scrutiny 
(Oct. 19, 2010). 
135 Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., Harvard Law School, Lecture to Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Splitups at Harvard Law School: The Death of “Enhanced” Scrutiny 
(Oct. 19, 2010); Mark Gordon, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz LLP, Lecture to the Mergers 
& Acquisitions Workshop at Harvard Law School: Course Overview – Seeing the Forest 
(Jan. 3, 2011). 
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for the most part unavailable to Canadian boards. Canadian courts 
scrutinize discriminatory repurchases in the context of a hostile takeover 
bid and generally will prevent directors from manipulating the 
shareholder franchise by such means.
136
 As discussed below, 
shareholders of Canadian corporations are entitled to call (or 
“requisition”) a special meeting at any time and may remove any 
director by ordinary resolution at that meeting. These are strong 
safeguards of the shareholder franchise. Canada should recognize that 
those safeguards are sufficient, should adopt a more permissive stance 
toward regulation of takeover defense, and should trust shareholders to 
decide for themselves whether the directors are acting in their interests 
and in the interests of the corporation. 
Acting on this proposal requires a number of changes, which at 
least requires rethinking NP 62-202 and the role of the CSA in 
developing national securities law. But, overall, so fundamentally 
changing the way securities law operates in Canada likely requires a 
national securities regulator. Enacting the legislation to create a national 
securities regulator would provide the opportunity to revise and limit 
the public interest jurisdiction that provincial securities commissions 
currently use to intervene in hostile takeover situations. The statutory 
authority that the commissions have under provincial securities law is 
too broad and too ill-defined. Moreover, this broad jurisdiction has 
permitted the commissions to develop a body of case law that 
effectively contradicts the law of the land as handed down by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Canada’s Parliament should resolve this 
conflict in the regulation of Canada’s corporations. Parliament should 
limit the commissions’ ability to continue undermining corporate law 
fiduciary duties. Parliament should trust the statutory regime that it and 
the provincial legislatures have developed to protect shareholder 
franchise. 
This argument to depend on shareholder franchise is particularly 
persuasive in a capital market such as Canada’s where institutional 
 
136 See, e.g., 347883 Alberta Ltd. v. Producers Pipelines, Inc., [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th) 
359 (Can. Sask. Ct. App.) (holding that board could not offer a discriminatory share 
repurchase program to dilute plaintiff–shareholder). But see 360713779 Icahn Partners LP v. 
Lions Gate Entm’t Corp., [2010] B.C.S.C. 1547, 75 B.L.R. (4th) 212, paras. 178–86 (Can.) 
(permitting the board to convert debt to equity in advance of a proxy battle where the CEO 
knew that the former debtholder would support the board rather than the bidder, based on 
ulterior motives of the plaintiff–shareholder and in light of benefits of the deleveraging to 
the corporation). 
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shareholders predominate. Institutional investors own on average over 
half of the shares of every company on the S&P/TSX 60 Index.
137
 These 
market conditions reduce the voter apathy collective-action problem 
with regard to exercise of the shareholder franchise that might prevail in 
a more dispersed capital market. These institutional investors are 
professional shareholders: it’s their job to monitor directors. Relying on 
the shareholder base and its franchise to discipline directors therefore 
becomes a viable option. 
Relying on the shareholder franchise also addresses the problems 
associated with a high level of institutional shareholder ownership. 
Institutional investors are influenced by short-term imperatives.
138
 
Merger arbitrage is a serious issue, as bids (or tender offers) present 
opportunities for opportunistic share purchases and sales. Chancellor 
Chandler recognized this issue in the Airgas case. In Airgas, the 
Chancellor held that a board could maintain an SRP in the face of a 
hostile bid based on a substantive coercion rationale in large part 
because of the threat of arbitrageurs: “The threat of ‘arbs’ is a new facet 
of substantive coercion, different from the substantive coercion claim 
recognized in Paramount.”
139
 The Chancellor found “sufficient evidence 
that a majority of stockholders might be willing to tender their shares 
regardless of whether the price is adequate or not”, because “a large 
number—if not all—of the arbitrageurs who bought into Airgas’s stock 
at prices significantly below the $70 offer price would be happy to 
tender their shares at that price regardless of the potential long-term 
value of the company.”
140
 
Canada’s “forced sale-by-auction” model enables such short-term 
thinking by shareholders to prevail—and even encourages it. 
Shareholders can do what they like with their own property. They are 
entitled to sell their shares to a willing buyer on the open market. 
However, a takeover bid is not about individual shareholders selling 
their individual property. It is about selling control of a corporation. 
Shareholders have no right to a control premium under either Canadian 
law or American law. But boards do have a right to manage the 
 
137 Hansell, et al., supra note 129, at 6. 
138 Leo E. Strine Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act 
and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (Nov. 2010) (“For a variety of reasons, these 
institutional investors often have a myopic concern for short-term performance.”). 
139 Airgas, 16 A.3d at 108. 
140 Id. at 111. 
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corporation and craft its business strategy. Selling a corporation is a 
business strategy decision related to the management of the corporation. 
Accordingly, that decision should be left to the board. 
Channeling the decision-making by Canadian shareholders into the 
proxy vote would avoid a heat-of-the-moment snap decision whether to 
tender to a bid and would prevent opportunistic cost-conscious bottom-
line oriented shareholders from derailing the corporation’s long-term 
business strategy for the promise of a couple of bucks. It would allow 
for a more rational business planning–oriented decision by shareholders 
as well as by the board. 
2. Operation of Canada’s Proxy Vote Safety Valve. 
a. Shareholder Meetings 
i. The good 
The classified board is effectively impossible in Canada. Formally, 
a corporation may create a classified board in its charter, but 
shareholders of a Canadian corporation may remove a director by 
ordinary resolution (i.e., by a simple majority
141
) either at the 
corporation’s annual general meeting or at a special meeting 
requisitioned for that purpose (by the holders of at least five percent of 
the corporation’s issued voting shares). Moreover, a corporation’s 
articles may not provide that the number of shareholder votes required 
to remove a director be greater than a simple majority.
142
 The 
shareholders then can choose to fill the vacancy created by removing a 
director at the same meeting.
143
 A court will not interfere with a 
properly-called shareholder meeting merely because the purpose of that 
meeting is to remove directors and elect a new board.
144
 
 
141 Business Corporations Act (Ontario), R.S.O., ch. B 16 (1990) (“OBCA”), §§ 5(5), 
122(1) (Can.) (subject to the qualification that “a director may not be removed from office if 
the votes cast against the director’s removal would be sufficient to elect him or her and such 
votes could be voted cumulatively at an election at which the same total number of votes 
were cast and the number of directors required by the articles were then being elected,” 
§ 120(f)); Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C 44 (1985)(“CBCA”), § 6(4) 
(Can.). 
142  Fox v. Castello Casino Corp., [2000] 8 B.L.R. (3d) 68 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 
143 CBCA § 109(1); OBCA § 122(1); see Bill Gula & Richard Fridman, Unsolicited 
Takeover Bids: Defensive Strategies, Guide to the Leading 500 Lawyers in Canada, Jan. 
2, 2006, http://www.dwpv.com/en/17623_17198.aspx. 
144 Fox v. Castello Casino Corp., 8 B.L.R. at 68. However, where that is the purpose of 
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The board must call a meeting within twenty-one days of receiving 
notice from the requisitioning shareholder. The board then must send 
the notice as specified in the corporation’s bylaws; though the OBCA 
limits the permissible advance-notice range for public companies to 
between twenty-one and fifty days before the actual meeting.
145
 If the 
board fails to call the requisitioned meeting, then the requisitioning 
shareholder may do so.
146
 Shareholders are entitled to claim 
reimbursement from the corporation “for the expenses reasonably 
incurred by them in requisitioning, calling and holding the meeting”—
which expenses include the cost of publishing notice to all 
shareholders.
147
 
Together these statutory protections enshrine the shareholders’ 
right to determine who represents them on the corporation’s board. 
Relative to shareholders in American corporations, shareholders in 
Canadian corporations are well-positioned to discipline their agents, the 
directors. Directors effectively are constantly up for election. Canadian 
regulators and legislators should respect and reinforce this model of 
corporate accountability and control rather than create a regulatory 
environment where corporations are constantly in play. The solution is 
to allow directors to make decisions regarding the corporation’s 
business strategy while ensuring that shareholders have these necessary 
mechanisms to discipline their agents. 
ii. The bad 
Notwithstanding the statutory protection that Canadian 
shareholders enjoy in disciplining directors, the field is not entirely 
tilted in the shareholder’s favor. For example, shareholders typically 
cannot raise a motion to remove a director from office directly from the 
floor during a shareholder meeting.
148
 Accordingly, removal of a director 
typically is accomplished by shareholder proposal and so potentially is 
 
the meeting, the meeting notice must state that an election is to be held upon successful 
removal of the challenged director. 
145 OBCA § 96(1); cf. CBCA § 135(1), Reg. 44 (setting sixty days as the maximum of 
the range). Under both statutes, for private companies the minimum is ten days. 
146 OBCA § 105(4); CBCA § 143(4). 
147 OBCA § 105(6); CBCA § 43(6). 
148 M. KAYE KERR & HUBERT W. KING, PROCEDURES FOR MEETINGS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 185 (Carswell Legal Publications, 1984). If specific notice for the item is 
required, the motion may not be raised directly from the floor during the meeting.  
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subject to several procedural hurdles.
149
 
In order to submit a proposal (to remove a director or otherwise), 
the shareholder must satisfy certain requirements. The investor must 
either: 
 Own not less than five percent of the corporation’s issued 
voting shares; 
 Have registered those shares (or else forego the right to 
submit a proposal requisitioning a special meeting at all); 
and 
 “[H]ave held an interest in at least [one per cent] of the 
corporation’s shares with a market value of at least 
$2,000.00 for at least six months prior to the day before the 
shareholder submits its proposal”; 
Or: 
 
 “[H]ave the support of other investors who meet those 
requirements in the aggregate.”
150
 
 
And “[i]f the person who submits the proposal fails to continue to 
satisfy [these] criteria up to and including the date of the meeting, then 
for a period of two years after the date of that meeting, any proposal 
made by that person will not be included in any management 
[information] circular [i.e., in management’s proxy materials].”
151
 
An eligible shareholder submitting a proposal to remove a director 
of a public company must provide valid notice of the special meeting to 
each (voting) shareholder. The proposing shareholder must send the 
notice as specified in the corporation’s bylaws, though the OBCA limits 
the permissible advance-notice range to between twenty-one and 
fifty days before the actual meeting.
152
 
The notice must include the text of any special resolution. It also 
must include a statement describing any special business to be 
 
149 Hansell, et al., supra note 129. (“[A] matter that is put on the agenda of a meeting of 
shareholders at the initiative of one or more shareholders, rather than the initiative of 
management.”) (referring to the CBCA and the OBCA). 
150 Id. at 45–46 (quoting, at note 104, Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 2001, 
S.O.R./2001-512, § 46 (Can.)). 
151 Id. at 45. 
152 OBCA § 96(1); cf. CBCA § 135(1), Reg. 44 (setting sixty days as the maximum of 
the range). Under both statutes, for private companies the minimum is ten days. 
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transacted at the meeting “in sufficient detail to permit [a] shareholder 
to form a reasoned judgement” on the matter at issue.
153
 However, any 
shareholder proposal and statement relating to special business together 
cannot exceed 500 words.
154
 Even if shareholders manage to get on the 
meeting agenda, “currently many shareholders are rushed through their 
presentation, often being timed with a large clock.”
155
 On the other hand, 
a director who is the subject of a proposal to be removed has a right to 
attend the meeting and be heard,
156
 including via written statement that is 
read by the meeting’s chairman.
157
 
Moreover, the corporation is not required to circulate a shareholder 
proposal or any statement made in connection with a proposal where: 
 The proposal is not submitted to the corporation at least 
sixty days before the anniversary date of the last annual 
meeting (if the matter is proposed to be raised at an annual 
meeting), or at least sixty days before a meeting other than 
the annual meeting (if the matter is proposed to be raised at 
a meeting other than the annual meeting); 
 It clearly appears that the primary purpose of the proposal 
is to enforce a personal claim or redress a personal 
grievance against the corporation or any of its directors, 
officers or security-holders; 
 It clearly appears that the proposal does not relate in any 
significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation; 
 Not more than two years before the receipt of the proposal, 
a person failed to present, in person or by proxy, at a 
meeting of shareholders, a proposal that, at the person’s 
request, had been included in a management information 
circular relating to the meeting; or 
 Substantially the same proposal was submitted to 
 
153 OBCA § 96(6)(b). 
154 O. Reg. 59/07 (Can.), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 62, para. 23.4 (“For the purposes of 
subsection 99(3.1) of the Act, the proposal referred to in subsection 99(2) of the Act and the 
statement referred to in subsection 99(3) of the Act shall together not exceed 500 words.”). 
155 HON. MICHAEL D. CHONG, M.P., STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE CANADA BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS ACT: REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 12 (June 2010) (citing testimony of Laura O’Neill, SHARE, to the Standing 
House of Commons Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Meeting No. 43 
(Nov. 16, 2009, 16:00)), available at http://publications.gc.ca. 
156 OBCA § 123(1); CBCA § 110(1). 
157 OBCA § 123(2); CBCA § 110(1). 
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shareholders in a management information circular or 
dissident’s information circular relating to a meeting of 
shareholders held within two years preceding the receipt of 
the shareholder’s request and the proposal was defeated.
158
 
The process of shareholder proposal submission can be litigated in 
two ways related to these grounds. The corporation may apply 
affirmatively to a court to restrain circulation of a shareholder proposal 
with its management information circular.
159
 Alternatively, the 
corporation may just refuse to circulate the proposal and prompt the 
shareholder to apply to a court to order that management include the 
proposal, typically requiring that the shareholder attempt to delay the 
meeting at which the proposal would be voted on.
160
 These potential 
responses by the corporation to a shareholder proposal to remove a 
director potentially increase the cost and delay associated with a 
shareholder meeting. The cost and delay limit the protection that 
Canada’s statutory regime affords to shareholders. 
However, these restrictions on shareholder ability to initiate a 
proxy battle to challenge a particular director or the entire board are not 
unreasonable. Canada’s statutory regime protects the exercise of the 
shareholder franchise, but also provides procedural checks that strive to 
protect the board from frivolous or malicious shareholder conduct. 
iii.The ugly 
For shareholder voting to be an effective tool in constraining and 
disciplining directors, the mechanisms by which votes are cast and 
counted need to be robust and reliable. However, the current state of the 
proxy voting system limits the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise 
in determining the will of a corporation’s shareholders. Improving the 
integrity of the system in practice would allow Canada to rely with 
more confidence on its admirable statutory protection of the shareholder 
franchise. 
The proxy voting system has several issues.
161
 First, the system is 
complicated and opaque. Many parties (often acting through third party 
representatives) interact and communicate with one another by means 
 
158 OBCA § 99(5). 
159 OBCA § 99(9); CBCA § 137(9). 
160 OBCA § 99(8); CBCA § 137(8) (reen. 2001, § 59(4)). 
161 The following paragraph is based on Hansell, et al., supra note 129, at ii–iii. 
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susceptible to administrative and technological error. This error is 
difficult to identify and correct because of the multiple parties involved 
and the lack of an established system of interaction. Second, there is one 
proxy agent for almost all intermediaries in Canada. This proxy agent’s 
conduct and compliance with what regulation exists currently are not 
regulated. Third, votes may be cast by persons who have no economic 
interest in the issuer. This separation of voting interest and economic 
interest means that voting is susceptible to strategic manipulation on 
behalf of interests other than the long-term success of the corporation. 
Fourth, how the votes are tabulated and proxies are cast is completely 
unregulated. Moreover, securities regulators do not monitor compliance 
with those aspects of the system that they do regulate. 
However, practitioners have begun a dialogue proposing solutions 
to the problems with the proxy voting system. This dialogue has 
brought public attention to these issues.
162
 The dialogue and attention is 
encouraging, suggesting that there is appetite for change in Canada’s 
legal and business communities. 
Another hurdle is the use of director slates in board elections. 
Approximately twenty-five percent of Canada’s largest public 
corporations currently use slate voting for directors.
163
 This means that it 
is difficult for shareholders to target their dissatisfaction against 
particular directors. However, there is a bright light on the horizon. 
Traditionally proxy contests have been rare in Canada; takeover bids 
have been “the principal method by which an acquiror will seek to 
acquire control of a target company on a non-negotiated basis” because 
of their high likelihood of success under the Canadian system.
164
 But 
more recently shareholders have been starting to use their votes to 
express dissatisfaction with particular directors, especially as 
 
162 See, e.g., Drew Hasselback, Quality of the Shareholder Vote, NATIONAL POST, Feb. 
16, 2011, available at http://business.financialpost.com/2011/02/16/quality-of-the-
shareholder-vote/#more-27989 (discussing Hansell, The Quality of the Shareholder Vote in 
Canada). 
163 HON. MICHAEL D. CHONG, M.P., STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE CANADA BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS ACT: REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 12, (June 2010) (citing Testimony of Judy Cotte, CCGG, to the Standing 
House of Commons Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Meeting No. 43 
(Nov. 16, 2009, 15.55 PM)). 
164 WILLIAM J. BRAITHWAITE AND JOHN J. CIARDULLO, STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP, M&A IN 
CANADA 3, (May 2004), www.stikeman.com/newslett/IFLRMA04.pdf; see also Marvin 
Yontef and Simon Romano, Canada, § 3.3, in ICLG TO: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2008, 
available at www.iclg.co.uk.  
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shareholders respond to a flagging economy with increased levels of 
activism.
165
 
As a result there has been “an increase in the number of proxy 
battles for control of boards of directors.”
166
 Majority voting has 
facilitated these trends as that system becomes more common among 
Canadian corporations. Specifically, 
[i]n 2010, of the 142 issuers who reported their voting results for 
director elections, the average percentage of votes withheld was 
8.9 percent of votes cast. Fifteen issuers had at least one director that 
received 20 percent or more votes withheld with respect to his or her 
nomination. Seven issuers had at least one director that received 
25 percent or more votes withheld with respect to his or her 
nomination.
167
 
Given the limited ability of a Canadian corporation to build 
structural defensive measures directly into its charter or bylaws,
168
 this 
uptick in proxy battle activity represents a potentially positive trend in 
exercise of the shareholder franchise that regulators and legislators 
should respond to.
169
 
b. Written Consent  
Shareholders have an option other than taking action at a meeting. 
Shareholders also may act by unanimous written consent through “a 
resolution in writing signed by all the shareholders [or their attorney 
authorized in writing] entitled to vote on that resolution at a meeting of 
shareholders.” This type of resolution “is as valid as if it had been 
passed at a meeting of the shareholders” and satisfies all requirements 
of the Act relating to that meeting of shareholders. The only relevant 
exception to this written consent option is where a director being 
removed decides to submit a written statement in his defense, as 
 
165 Telephone Interview with Sean Farrell, McMillan LLP (Apr. 19, 2011). 
166 Sean Farrell & Robert McDermott, Canada, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN 61 
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: 2010 55 (Casey Cogut ed.) (Law Business Research Ltd., 2010) 
(1998), available at http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/books/21/mergers-acquisitions/.  
167 Hansell, et al., supra note 129, at 12–13. 
168 See TORYS LLP, TAKEOVER BIDS IN CANADA AND TENDER OFFERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A GUIDE FOR ACQUIRORS AND TARGETS 30–31 (2009), 
http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/Takeover_Bids_Guide
_2009.pdf (enumerating defensive measures common in the U.S. and contrasting Canada). 
169 Cf.  Thomson et al., supra note 60, at A74. (contrasting Canada’s liberal director 
removal process with proxy battles in the U.S., which “can be a time consuming proposition 
that can last well over a year”). 
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provided by subsection 123(2) of the OBCA.
170
 
3. A Selection of Alternative Proposals 
a. “Time-test” proposal 
One alternative proposal to change the current state of Canadian 
takeover defense regulation is to extend the amount of time during 
which boards are permitted to keep an SRP in place.
171
 Its proponent 
argues that more time would “enable[ ] management to formulate a 
superior strategic alternative” rather than “being forced to relinquish 
control due to external circumstances.”
172
 
However, such a proposal assumes that there are circumstances 
where a transaction is not in the best interests of the corporation but 
shareholders nevertheless would tender to a hostile bid. Furthermore, 
perpetuating the time-test approach to takeover defense regulation 
cannot help but impose yet another arbitrary limit on the amount of time 
where that period of time is decided by a regulator and not by the board 
or by shareholders. A regulation-based “solution” raises the related 
questions of “who knows best?” and “who decides?” The time-test 
proposal answers these questions by vesting power in regulators. But it 
is the board and the shareholders that we actually should allow to make 
major transformational decisions with regard to the fate of the 
corporation. 
Moreover, such a proposal does not adequately countenance the 
relative ease with which directors can be removed from Canadian 
boards. Boards need the added protection of the SRP to balance against 
that constant threat of impeachment that they face, directors still can be 
sued for breach of fiduciary duty or for interfering with exercise of the 
shareholder franchise. The U.S. historically has relied more heavily on 
these tools notwithstanding their less robust character there.
173
 Canada 
should capitalize on its advantages in protection of the shareholder 
franchise. 
 
170 OBCA § 123(1)-(2). 
171 See, e.g., Ronald Podolny, Fixing What Ain’t Broke: In Defence of Canadian Poison 
Pill Regulation, 67 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 47 (2009). 
172 Id. at 89. 
173 Cf. Blasius Indus., Inc., 564 A.2d at 651. However, as discussed above, Canada’s 
statutory regime more effectively protects Canadian shareholders than does the United 
States’. 
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b. “All or Nothing” Proposal 
Another proposal takes its inspiration from the U.K.’s requirement 
that any listed firm’s shareholders each own either less than thirty 
percent of a firm’s shares or one-hundred percent of them.
174
 This rule 
would translate into an “all or nothing” takeover requirement: 
“acquirers must buy 100[percent] or stay away.”
175
 Its proponent argues 
that this option would not inhibit an active market for corporate control 
but would ensure a “genuine democratic accountability of corporate 
insiders.”
176
 Imposing accountability is important, as corporate insiders 
have a strong presence in Canadian board rooms and shareholder 
meetings, and undemocratic, dual-class share structures are relatively 
common in Canada.
177
 Given the existing prevalence of institutional 
shareholders in Canadian corporations, it is possible that this proposal 
could have the beneficial results that its proponent claims. He adds a 
caveat to his proposal: Canada should ensure the independence of the 
boards of its institutional investors (specifically pension funds) from 
corporate influence.
178
 
This proposal is not inconsistent with my proposal. The 
proponent’s caveat is a positive development given the increasing 
importance of pension funds and other institutional investors as 
shareholders in Canadian corporations. The proposal itself is predicated 
on creation of a national securities regulator,
179
 which requires action by 
Canada’s Parliament. Enactment of such legislation would harmonize 
Canadian securities regulation, and would provide an opportunity to 
correct the too-broad public interest jurisdiction that provincial 
securities commissions currently use to intervene in hostile takeover 
situations. 
 
 
174 Randall Morck, Shareholder Democracy in Canada 31, (Univ. of Alberta Sch. of 
Business Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://www.business.ualberta.ca/RandallMorck/Research/~/media/University%20of%20Alb
erta/Faculties/Business/FacultyAndStaff/FSA/RandallMorck/Documents/Research/Working
Papers/2010_11_14_Shareholder_Democracy_in_Canada.pdf. 
175 Id. at 32. 
176 Id.  
177 Telephone Interview with Sean Farrell, McMillan LLP (Apr. 19, 2011). 
178 Morck, supra note 150, at 32. 
179 Id. at 31. 
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4. Concluding Remarks. 
M&A activity is not always successful. Bids sometimes fail and 
parties sometimes terminate deals. Companies’ post-merger 
performance sometimes disappoints. Determining which transactions 
are likely to disappoint and which are likely to create value for 
shareholders demands a high level of business acumen. Corporate law is 
built on the foundational principle that directors have this business 
acumen, and has created a law of agents and principals to ensure that 
director–agents exercise it in the best interest of the corporation and of 
the shareholder–principals who own it. Shareholders have recourse to 
the ballot box and to the courthouse where directors do not uphold their 
duties under corporate law. 
Where the directors do—i.e., where they take informed action with 
good faith belief that the action is in the best interest of the 
corporation—courts and securities regulators alike should respect their 
decisions. It is not the place of the court or the securities regulator—just 
as it is not the place of the shareholder—to manage the corporation and 
decide the details of its business strategy. The decision to enter 
transactions that risk these negative outcomes should be entered into 
carefully and as part of a well-considered business strategy; by 
corollary, a well-considered business strategy to remain independent is 
one that should remain available to a board. Reflexively putting a 
company in play as soon as a hostile bidder makes his first bear-hug 
favours hostile bids and undermines that division of ownership and 
management that is the foundation of our corporate law. Instead, 
directors should be free—within the bounds of their fiduciary duties and 
disciplined by the ballot box—to determine the company’s business 
strategy. 
a. Analysis of M&A Activity 
Currently it is too easy to take over a Canadian corporation. 
Canadian deals typically are “easier and less time-consuming to 
accomplish” than comparable American deals.
180
 And, as in the United 
States, studies of post-merger performance of Canadian acquirors 
consistently reveal that mergers typically are not good for acquirors. 
One study in 2004 examined the long-term performance of acquiror 
securities in 267 consummated Canadian acquisitions that took place 
 
180 Cf. Thomson et al., supra note 60, at A73. 
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between 1980 and 2000. The study concluded that “Canadian acquirers 
significantly underperform over the three-year post-event period”.
181
 
Additionally, a study of post-announcement stock performance in 2000 
referred to, without challenging, studies of corporate earnings that 
reveal a “declining average bidder firm performance during the two- to 
five-year period following merger announcements.”
182
 
The Canadian regulatory environment renders corporations much 
more vulnerable to these negative performance outcomes. Hostile bids 
in Canada historically have had a higher success rate than hostile 
American bids. In a 2004 comparative study, two Wharton School 
professors determined that Canada’s success rate for hostile takeover 
bids was approximately thirty-five percent between 1988 and 1998, 
relative to a twenty-two percent success rate for such bids in the U.S. 
during the same period.
183
 More recent data suggests that the Canadian 
success rate continues to be higher relative to the United States. Since 
1998, the success rate for hostile bids for an American target has been 
approximately 27.6 percent. By contrast, the success rate for hostile bids 
for a Canadian target has remained considerably higher, approximately 
35.6 percent.
184
 
This success rate is equally applicable in non-hostile situations. In 
the United States, 
[a]lthough many corporate law scholars continue to obsess over the 
few cases in which corporate boards were able to keep their 
stockholders from accepting premium acquisition bids, the realities 
of the marketplace and the pressure that case law put on directors to 
act faithfully toward stockholders led to a huge increase in mergers 
and acquisitions activity.
185
 
 
181 Jean-Francois L’Her, The long-run performance of mergers and acquisitions: 
evidence from the Canadian stock market, 33 FIN. MGMT. 27, 27 (Dec. 22, 2004), available 
at http://www.allbusiness.com/personal-finance/investing-stock-investments/294218-1.html. 
182 B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thornburn, Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic 
and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada, 35 J. OF FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1, 1–2 (Mar. 2000). 
183 William D. Schneper & Mauro F. Guillen, Stakeholder Rights and Corporate 
Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 263, 285 
(“Table 1”) (2004). The study found that of 88 hostile attempts in Canada during the period, 
30 succeeded; compared to 97 of 429 American attempts. 
184 Bloomberg LP (MA Equity database search), accessed Apr. 22, 2011 (defining as 
“hostile” those deals designated by Bloomberg as “hostile,” “unsolicited to hostile,” and 
“friendly to hostile.”).  
185 Leo E. Strine Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications 
of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TOR. L. J. 241, 
260 (2008) (citing Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
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This statement is even more applicable to data regarding general 
M&A activity in Canada. For example, of the 1,096 deals announced in 
2010,
186
 only seventy-two were terminated (fifty of which had a 
Canadian target).
187
 Though it is likely that many of these aborted deals 
were hostile transactions (which account for a higher percentage of the 
total number of aborted deals)
188
, that total number of aborted deals 
remains small as a percentage of all announced deals. These numbers 
account for the anecdotally-repeated fact that hostile bids almost always 
result in a transaction, either with the bidder or with a white knight. This 
always-on-firesale state of corporate Canada in fact is bad for 
shareholders, in light of the studies of post-merger performance. 
b. Shareholders as Informed Corporate Citizens 
Shareholders are not “suddenly wiser” in deciding how to vote in a 
proxy battle presenting the same issue as is presented to shareholders in 
evaluating a hostile bid. However, for the position of “director” to mean 
something, and for the concept of fiduciary duties to mean anything, 
there needs to be an at least symbolic protection of the directors’ 
decisions on behalf of the corporation. If shareholders decide that the 
director’s decisions are not in the best interest of the corporation, then 
they have options. Shareholders can sell their shares in the corporation 
that that director manages; there is no right to a premium but there is a 
public market for the shares. Or shareholders can vote that director out 
of office; shareholders have a well-protected right to decide who 
represents them. 
Easy impeachment accomplishes the same constraining function 
(market for corporate control constraint) as a tender offer, but there is 
nothing about a tender offer that is so sacred that it should be protected 
and excluded from the traditional division between shareholder and 
 
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873–80 (2002) 
and stating that the article “detail[s] the huge increase in mergers and acquisitions activity 
during the period from 1980 to 2000.”). 
186 M&A Quarterly Report – Q4/10, CROSBIE & CO. INC., 
http://www.crosbieco.com/ma/index.html. 
187 E-mail from Yvonne Yip, PostMedia Network Inc., Apr. 5, 2011 (on file with 
author). 
188 Are you a takeover target?, DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_CA/ca/insights/insights-and-
issues/3a9ca68c4d101210VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm (“hostile bids have a 
termination rate of 56%, compared to 10% for friendly bids.”). The Baffinland bid and the 
Lions Gate bid (discussed supra) and the BHP Billiton Ltd. bid all appear on the list. 
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director responsibility. This division respects the role of the director in 
making strategic decisions regarding the fate of the corporation—which 
should include the strategic decision whether to remain independent. 
Even if it is only symbolic and formalistic, directors should make that 
decision. Directors can be impeached for taking that position, and 
challengers can run on a platform of openness to unsolicited bids. In any 
event, directors should not be constrained in exercising their fiduciary 
duties by considerations imposed by a third-party administrative 
tribunal purporting to defend shareholder interests, where the existing 
statutory regime already protects those interests. 
 
